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Augustus was the greatest Emperor of Ancient Rome, but the biggest defeat to his 
legend, was his lost legions from the Battle of the Teutoberg Forest in 9 A.D.  Augustus 
and the Roman legions were the ultimate sign of Roman invincibility as quoted by 
Suetonius, “Behold them, conquerors of the world, all clad in Roman gowns”1
 Germany had long been a problem of Rome, because Rome wanted to expand to 
the frontier, but Rome’s arm couldn’t reach that far.  Julius Caesar’s conquest of the rich 
lands of Gaul could only be secured if a satisfactory frontier could be established against 
the barbarians east of the Rhine
.  The 
landscape of Germany had been left relatively untouched by Julius Caesar after his 
conquest of Gaul in 58 B.C., until 16 B.C., when Augustus’ thirst to expand and secure 
the frontier of Germany would be a huge mistake.  His choice of Quinctilius Varus to 
lead his legions would be one that he would forever regret.    Archaeological evidence 
has shown the plan the Romans had and the subsequent abandonment of their plans from 
conquest to fortifications.  Digs done in later years would reveal the tragedy of the site 
and the way the slaughter was carried out.  Rome’s policies would change after the 
slaughter, and Germany would forever be a thorn in their side.  
2
                                               
1 Suetonius.  (77) 
.  From the 50’s to the 20’s B.C. Rome went through 
civil wars, leadership changes, power struggles and were really to weak for Julius Caesar 
or anyone else to turn their attention towards the Germans.  Once Augustus had stabilized 
Rome, the emperor could start to think about what to do with the Rhine.  After 19 B.C. 
the attention of Rome would once again turn toward the people east of the Rhine.  The 
2 Todd, Malcolm.  The Northern Barbarians 100 B.C.- A.D. 300.  (30) 
intent was no longer to establish a defensive frontier along the Rhine, but to invade and 
occupy a huge area to the north-east of that valley3
Augustus would spend 16-13 B.C., setting up the defensive positions on the left 
bank of the Rhine and would start to fortify the positions.  Though Rome took the Alpine 
passes in 15 B.C., it still couldn’t take the entire territory between the Elbe and the Rhine.  
Augustus’ began to set up fortifications in Germany for the future advancement on it.  
Historians and other writers in discussing the defeat of Varus , and its bearing upon 
subsequent history of Rome and Germany, are almost united in the belief that Augustus 
until the year 9 A.D. had in view the complete subjugation of Germany as far as the river 
Elbe
.  Augustus saw Germany as his Gaul.   
4
Germany for the next 30 years would be the place to take up command if you 
wanted to advance in Augustus’ and Rome’s favor.  The upper Danube was established 
as the imperial frontier following the conquest of Southern Bavaria in 15 B.C. by the 
armies led by the Roman generals Tiberius and Drusus
.  However, whether Rome had the ability to make such a large scale attack against 
a territory so large is debatable.   
5
Archaeological research has identified major forts at Nijmegan, Xanten, Moers-
Asberg, Neuss, Mainz and Bonn, other smaller military forts were established at other 
locations
.  The fortifications were in their 
infancy, but it was still a major reach of power, because the frontier had been left alone 
for so long.  In the beginning Augustus’ plan was well conceived, and was the 
prototypical way for Romans to set up their fortifications before conquest.   
6
                                               
3 Todd, Malcolm.  (30) 
.  The fortifications of Augustus have become a wealth of evidence on the 
4 Olfather, and Carter.  (9) 
5 Wells, Peter S.  The Barbarians Speak: How the Conquered Peoples Shaped Roman Europe.  (8) 
6 Wells, Peter S.  (89) 
beginning of settlements in Germany, through which even examples of coin trading 
existed.  Digs have shown the examples of coinage in and around Magdalensberg, 
Bibracte, Neuss, Obraden, Haltern, Mainz, Augsberg-Oberhausen, Vindonissa and other 
places7.  Coinage has always been a valuable tool in establishing a civilization in a 
territory you want to conquer.  It is a notable fact that despite the relatively rich finds of 
terra sigillita and coinage from Obraden, Haltern, and Dangstetten, there is still a genuine 
controversy about the closing date of Obraden and Dangstetten and about the opening 
date of Haltern8
Pottery was also another piece of evidence that has been used to show the extent 
of the Romans plan to advance through Germany.  At Nijmegen, an outer ditch contained 
Augustan pottery, the gate-building itself is dated by fragments of a jug handle, said to be 
unmistakably of early-first century type
.  The fact the coinage is there shows an undeniable shift in Roman policy 
of conquest and expansionism.  The finds themselves are significant, because they do 
show a relationship of trade between the Romans and the Germans, which Romans do 
many times before the ultimate conquest of a territory.  Coinage is the best archaeological 
tool for dating a site.     
9.  The pottery is especially important for its 
symbolic use and the fact that it meant people had been entrenched there.  At Mainz, the 
space in the intervallum between the road and the rampart yielded pottery contemporary 
with that from Obraden and the latest pottery was that of Augustan or early Tiberian10
                                               
7 Wells, Peter S.  The German Policy of Augustus: An Examination of the Archaeological Evidence.   
.  
The archaeological evidence is important, because it shows the development of trade, 
fortification, and  conquest of Germany.  The ancient Germanic tribes of this region had 
 (268-69) 
8 Todd, Malcolm.  “Rome and the Germans: The Frontier and Beyond”.  (328) 
9 Wells, Peter S.  (118) 
10 Wells, Peter S.  (143) 
traded intensively with the Roman world, and thousands of Roman coins, pots, bronze 
vessels, pieces of jewelry, and other items have been found on their settlements and in 
their graves11
Burials are the final important measurement of a Roman settlement.  Burials at  
the middle of the Elbe-Saale basin have great examples of trade.  However, only eight of 
the graves contained imported Roman bronze vessels
.  The Romans were so use to this type of procedure, that they would be 
shocked at the upcoming events that would stop their plans forever. 
12.  An inventory of items shows 
that there was Romanizing before 9 A.D.  Urns have been found there in Roman style, 
including a vessel turned sideways, a jar, and a vessel all used as burial items13.  The 
extent of the burials shows that there were Roman items buried among Roman sites and 
Germanic tribes.  Several other cemeteries have been found with a series or urns at 
Prositz, Wahlitz, and Kleinzerbst14
 One thing Rome always knew how to do was to conquer a civilization, Augustus 
should have known Germany was not ready for the taking, but it was his Roman ego that 
blinded him to what the real intentions of the Germans were.  In A.D. 7, Augustus 
appointed Quinctilius Varus his legate, or governor, for the Rhineland.  The position put 
him in charge of the legions stationed on the Rhine frontier and gave him responsibility 
for Rome’s offensive policy in Germany east of the river
.  All reinforcing the fact that the Romans had been 
trying extensively to establish trade, fortify, and conquer the Rhine for a long period of 
time.    
15
                                               
11 Wells, Peter S.  The Battle That Stopped Rome.  (46) 
.  There has been debate over 
12 Todd.  The Northern Barbarians.  (49) 
13 Todd.  (49) 
14 Todd.  (49) 
15 Wells, Peter S.  (83) 
what kind of military leader Varus really was, some have defended him, but most ancient 
Romans have blasted his abilities.   
It is difficult to determine the true nature of the man, Varus.  Velleius Paterculus, 
who knew Varus personally, had only bad words for him, suggesting he was incompetent 
as a military leader and that he enriched himself improperly during his governorship in 
Syria16
 Arminius had served with the Roman military as a commander of an auxiliary 
unit and had distinguished himself on the field of battle
.  Varus’ position was a very important one, because his main purpose besides 
conquering was to suppress some rebellious Germanic tribes.  The fact he was given a 
position like this shows he was not as incompetent as historians have made him out to be.  
With a tradition of alliances with some tribesman in the area, Varus thought it would be a 
walk in the park, but he didn’t know a former ally was going to attack him. 
17
Arminius had studied Roman tactics and knew the Germans couldn’t go toe to toe 
with Romans in open field.  Tacitus and Strabo wrote that Varus was either negligently 
ignorant of the terrain or had been deliberately misled by tribal leaders he considered 
trustworthy and loyal
.  Varus had trusted him before 
and thought of Arminius as a friend of Rome, which was a main miscalculation on the 
part of Augustus and Varus.  The egotism of Rome was so enormous, because everybody 
fell the way they were setting up the Germans to.  They couldn’t see the fact that 
Arminius would support them against the Gauls, but would not against the people of 
Germany.  Arminius would not stand by and let the Romans conquer his Churesci tribe  
18
                                               
16 Wells, Peter S.  (85-86) 
.  You could make a case for both, because everything he did was 
totally against Roman training and style.  According to Suzanne Wilbers-Rost of the 
17 Wells, Peter S.  (26) 
18 Dornberg, John.  (29) 
Museum of Cultural History, “Romans were unbeatable in open field or when ensconced 
in their own fortified encampments surrounded by palisades, ramparts, trenches and 
moats”19
Hearing of rebellious activities that were a diversion by Arminius, Varus took the 
17th, 18th, and 19th legions to quell what was going on.  Varus and his force of 20,000 
infantry and cavalry, which was accompanied by some 10,000 slaves, women, medical 
personal and civilian tradesman, marched straight into a trap
.  It’s obvious Arminius not only knew this, but planned his strategy for this, he 
believed the only way to beat the Romans would be to get them trapped between the 
forest trees and a marshy area. 
20.  Moving between a 
marshland and a forest, the legion was walking six across in some places it was a symbol 
of Roman arrogance turned stupidity.  In the open field, the heavenly armed and highly 
disciplined Roman troops would have prevailed, even if outnumbered by the native 
forces21.  Arminius knew the country much better and knew exactly where to hit the 
legions, Varus couldn’t have selected a worse area.  The place was the narrow track 
between the Kalkriese Hill and the great bog, a regular passageway that was easy enough 
for local travelers to negotiate, but presented complex impediments to a large marching 
army, especially since the plotters had made some alterations to the natural terrain22
It was a basic mistake, one that a well-trained Roman general would have never 
made, unfortunately it was too late to know what hit them.  Suddenly a chilling yell was 
heard as attackers on all sides fell upon the struggling Romans, Varus and his army were 
.  The 
natural boundaries turned into Germanic fortifications.   
                                               
19 Dornberg, John.  (30) 
20 Dornberg, John.  (26) 
21 Wells, Peter S.  (29) 
22 Wells, Peter S.  (161) 
caught completely off guard and in the worst possible situation23.  The scene was that of 
massive carnage, women and children were amongst the group, but Arminius knew that 
Varus was there to conquer his people.  He took full advantage of Varus’ stupid mistake, 
and brought the hammer down on the Romans.  Once their order was broken, which 
happened in the first seconds of the attack, their command structure ceased to function 
and the unit’s maneuverability was destroyed.  Despite their training, the troops were 
completely overwhelmed by this massive attack in this terrifying environment24
The Germans tore through the lines at such a pace that Romans were attacking 
Romans, the women, children, slaves and civilians were caught in the bloodbath with 
them.  The German chargers, emboldened by seeing Roman troops at their mercy, lunged 
savagely with their lances, piercing abdomens and chests, and sending the front row of 
Romans staggering backwards into the troops behind them
.  There 
was no hope for the Romans, the Germans pushed through them with such ferocity, that 
they had the Romans panicked and horrified. 
25
Varus’ legions were completely wiped out and he knew there was no chance of 
him or his soldiers making it back to Rome.  Having seen the savagery by which the 
barbarians had treated his wounded he knew they had only one option, to die with their 
dignitas.  So Varus and all the senior officers, fearing that they would either be taken 
.  The Germans kept their 
assault, able to move freely, while the Romans were completely outflanked.  When Varus 
saw what had happened, his men immediately tried to flee, but even they were attacked 
and when they looked back they could see the thousands of German soldiers taking out 
the Roman soldiers.   
                                               
23 Wells, Peter S.  (28) 
24 Wells, Peter S.  (172) 
25 Wells, Peter S.  (173) 
alive or slaughtered by their bitter enemies- for they had already been wounded- nerved 
themselves for the dreaded but unavoidable act, and took their own lives26.  It was the 
most embarrassing defeat in the history of Rome, one that would forever change its 
policy in the frontier.  The casualty list was overwhelming, nearly all in the Roman 
legions were killed, but out of the 18,000 Germans, only 500 were killed and another 
1500 wounded27
Archaeological digs that have been able to exist in the last few decades have been 
able to shed more light on the conditions of the battlefield in the Teutoberg Forest.  The 
Museum and Park Kalkriese Strasse 69 , Bramsche, is situated on the actual battle site, it 
displays many of the objects recovered through excavation on the site of the park, giving 
visitors a good idea of what things were like in  9 A.D.
.  The battle was over in a matter of minutes, Rome’s northern army was 
beaten. 
28  The digs at these sites have 
helped us to understand the battle and the conditions of the time much better.  At the 
Northern edge of the battle, Wolfgang Schluter, head of the archaeology department at 
the Museum of Cultural History in Osnabruck has been studying the site for years and 
has come up with many of the weapons used.  He has found hundreds of Roman military 
artifacts including lead slingstones, lance and spear points, javelin tips, belt buckles, 
pieces of cuirasses and armor, fragments of a helmet, the soles of infantry sandals, and a 
beautiful iron mask covered with silver29
                                               
26 Cassius Dio.  The Roman History: The Reign of Augustus.  (238) 
.  The dig is a great find and has become a well 
visited site, with a statue of Arminius on the hill.   
27 Wells, Peter S.  (182) 
28 Wells, Peter S.  The Battle That Stopped Rome.  (224) 
29 Dornberg, John.  (28) 
Many artifact remains are still there, because the Romans never really had time to 
retrieve them, so they’ve remained buried in time.  The coinage of the time is the most 
significant proof that this is the battle site, hundreds of copper and silver denari, all from 
the reign of Augustus, and all minted before 9 A.D. and even some of the counterstamp 
of Varus himself30
The equipment the Germans used is another such discovery, which leads us to 
now understand the ferocity of their attacks and the fear it must have struck in the 
Romans.  The German spears weighed an average of one and a half pounds, thrown at 
speeds of fifty-five feet per second, they struck with seventy foot pounds of energy
.  The vast amounts of coinage shows the dire straights that the 
Romans went through, and that the Germans wanted nothing more to do with Rome, 
because they just left the coins there as a sign of defiance.       
31.  
With the new evidence of the battle you can understand why the scene was so memorably 
horrific for the Romans, and why it has been written about at such great lengths.  The 
swords the Germans used were particularly effective in their use, especially the short 
swords, which could be used to puncture or slash, causing the soldier to bleed to death.  
Puncture wounds or deep gashes to vital organs would cause immediate death.  More 
typical were slashes to the face, neck, arms, abdomen, and legs, that opened wide gashes, 
leading to rapid blood loss.  If a warrior hacked off a legionary’s head death was 
immediate, but when he hacked off an arm or a leg it would take a matter of minutes for 
the victim to die of blood loss32
                                               
30 Dornberg, John.  (29) 
.  All of these archaeological finds point to the total and 
complete massacre of the Roman legions.  The fact that the site is still intact the way it is, 
shows the scale that they were beaten.    
31 Wells, Peter S.  (179) 
32 Wells, Peter S.  (180-181) 
When Augustus heard news of what happened he began thinking about the fact 
that the Germans had an open path to Rome.  The Romans gave up all fortresses in the 
frontier except one that they held from attack by the barbarians.  The Germans found 
themselves unable to capture this position, because they couldn’t understand the concept 
of siege warfare, also the Romans employed a large number of archers, whose arrows 
regularly checked their attacks and caused them heavy losses33
It wasn’t just the loss of the conquest, but Roman historians would write of the 
importance of this particular band of legions, and how important they were to the Roman 
Empire.  Velleius wrote, “this army was the most proficient of all, and ranked number 
one in terms of discipline, strength and military experience among all the Roman armed 
forces.  It was destroyed by the laxity of its leader Varus, the perfidy of its enemies, and 
the unjustness of fate”
.  The loss of his legions 
was too much for Augustus to bear, it would haunt him the rest of his days.  Indeed, it is 
said that Augustus took the disaster so deeply that he left his hair and beard untrimmed 
for months; he would often beat his head on a door, shouting “Quinctilius Varus, give me 
back my legions “ and always kept the anniversary as a day of deep mourning claims 
Suetonius. 
34
Augustus still had tremendous fear for the invading Germanic tribes, the loss of 
three of his best legions was something he could prepare for, but he still couldn’t create 
three new ones out of thin air.  It would have been difficult to take Germany with 7 or 8 
legions, but now he didn’t even have one in that area.  Cassius Dio says this of the 
.  The replacement troops would later have discipline and morale 
problems.  The lost legions were not ones that could be easily replaced. 
                                               
33 Cassius Dio.  (238) 
34 Dornberg, John.  (32) 
incident, “His feelings were not only for sorrow for the soldiers who had perished, but for 
fear of the provinces of Germany and of Gaul, above all he expected that the enemy 
would attack Italy and even Rome itself”35
The German’s might and organization was far less then Augustus feared, they had 
no unity to strike out against the Roman Empire.  The news of the defeat and its scale 
was so intense that it led Augustus into a panic, but he would regroup.  It is rumored, but 
not known that Livia pressured him to send Tiberius to Germany as a test.  She could 
have been trying to make a political move for Tiberius, considering how old Augustus 
was.  In any case Augustus did send Tiberius there with instruction to take it cautiously.  
According to Cassius Dio, “Tiberius decided not to cross the Rhine, but stayed in his 
positions keeping watch to see that the barbarians did not cross either.  For their part the 
enemy, knowing that he was there did not venture to force a passage”
.  Augustus forced men to give up property and 
serve in the military to restock his legions, some of which were free citizens.  Fearing that 
some might start an uprising, the ones who didn’t he had summarily put to death.   
36.  It is not totally 
known the orders that were given by Augustus to Tiberius, but they must have been 
severe.  The cautiousness of Tiberius not to offend or make any great mistake is evident 
in all aspects of his campaign, including the discipline.  According to Suetonius, 
“Tiberius imposed the severest discipline on his men: reviving obsolete methods of 
punishment or branding them with ignominy for misbehavior”37
When the Romans did go back to the woods of Teutoberg Forest, it was a sight of 
tremendous horror on the part of the Romans, the dead remained there unburied.  Tacitus 
.  The Romans did 
manage to stave off the Germans, but this was the strongest Rome would be for awhile.   
                                               
35 Cassius Dio.  (239) 
36 Cassius Dio.  (240) 
37 Suetonius.  (124)   
writes, “On the open ground were whitening bones, scattered were men had fled, heaped 
on up where they had fought back.  Fragments of spears and of horses’ limbs lay there- 
also human heads, fastened to tree trunks.  In groves nearby where the outlandish alters at 
which the Germans had massacred the Roman colonels and senior company-
commanders”38
The scene of them returning to the site of the massacre is one of the most famous 
legends in Roman history.  It was so horrific that almost every Roman historian has put 
their own spin on what happened.  When hearing of the scene his men had seen and the 
treatment of the dead it is said that everything German disgusted Augustus.  He even 
developed an aversion for his German bodyguards and dismissed them, loyal men that 
they were, they had become sinister in his eyes
.  The worst part was the men would be unable to bury the men until later. 
39
The debacle of the Teutoberg Forest was one that Augustus was never meant to 
recover from.  The loss of his legions was too much for him, his health and even times his 
sanity become less.  When discussing matters that bothered him, Augustus would seem to 
become troubled.  Amid this sort of conversation the health of Augustus deteriorated, 
some suspected his wife of foul play
.  The German problem haunted 
Augustus for the rest of his reign, unable to cope with the loss.   
40.  Augustus would die two years later, his plans of 
German conquest unfulfilled, it would become his greatest failure.  The senate would 
declare Augustus to be immortal, assigned him sacred rites and priests to perform them41
                                               
38 Dornberg, John.  (30) 
.  
This would not be the end of the Germanic campaigns, Tiberius still had a hunger for the 
frontier land and wanted to take them over.  The situation would not get any better. 
39 Lissner, Ivar.  The Caesars: Might and Madness.  .  (79) 
40 Tacitus.  The Annals of Imperial Rome.  (34) 
41 Cassius Dio.  (257) 
Major difficulties arose after the battle, when Augustus was alive he had major 
difficulties after Teutoberg.  The loss was so significant, because even before Rome was 
dealing Pannonia.  Edwin Meyer thinks that although Arminius’ revolt and the battle as a 
military event had no greater effect than the revolts and victories of the Celts and the 
Pannonians, the battle nevertheless was decisive because it was not possible for Rome to 
raise troops sufficient to win back the advantage lost42.  Augustus had forced the majority 
of men into mandatory service and even then could not get the troops he needed.  There 
was also the need to train the troops as well, a task that was not easy.  The conquest of 
Germany would have entailed a huge levy of men suddenly rushed to the spot, would 
have proved useless or rather injurious43
The death of Augustus would throw the empire into a panic in the beginning, but 
even before he died policy was changing.  The disaster that overtook the legions of Varus 
in his battle caused Augustus to give up his plans, and to renounce all hope of making 
Germany a province
.  Rome would have had to train the men before 
they fought which was a massive and expensive undertaking. 
44.  When Rome dealt with the Pannonian revolt they had the 
majority of their military stationed on the Rhine.  This hints at the fact the military was 
overstretched before the lost legions of Augustus.  Augustus’ handwritten will from 3 
April the previous year before his death, advised Tiberius not to follow as aggressive a 
policy of imperial expansion as he had done45
                                               
42 Oldfather and Canter.  (38) 
.  Ironically, Tiberius’ lack of action in the 
Rhine had angered Augustus in earlier campaigns.   
43 Oldfather, and Canter.  (42) 
44 Oldfather, and Canter.  (13) 
45 Murdoch.  (131) 
One of the other key factors in the halt on the Rhine was a rethinking of national 
identity.  The battle of the Teutoberg Forest is a turning point in national destinies, an 
ebbing in the tide of Rome’s sway over the world, a shifting of the bounds of Roman rule 
from the Elbe to the Rhine and the Danube46.  The victory established the Germanic 
tribes as a new opponent of the Romans and created a leader to rally around in Arminius.  
The victory of Arminius deserves to be reckoned among those deliverances which have 
affected for centuries the happiness of mankind47
Tiberius was the Emperor who replaced Augustus.  He was known as a cautius 
general when he served in Germany, but a very capable one.  Tiberius was a general and 
not good at politics.  Tiberius understood the complexities of the Germanic tribes.  
Tiberius knew that it was pointless to wage war beyond the Rhine, if by defeating and 
massacring one tribe, you were merely clearing room for seven other tribes of devils, 
fiercer and even less tractable from beyond the Elbe
.  The Chruesci were now the dominant 
tribe in all of Germany, but still lacked cohesive unity to rule the region against the 
Romans.  The victory solidified that there would be Germanic tribes in the area for an 
extended amount of time.  Rome had lost their chance to conquer, but would still try to 
do it. 
48
                                               
46 Olfather, and Canter.  (14) 
.  This is the crux of the German 
problem there is no empire or centralized government to defeat.  However, it’s a problem 
for the Germans as well, because they have no unity and even fight among different 
tribes.  It is a fact that the Germans left no literature, no monument, and no memory of 
themselves until they again came into relations with Rome’s new representative 
47 Oldfather, and Canter.  (15) 
48 Wells, C.M.  (245) 
Charlemagne49
Tiberius selected Germanicus to retake the land and territory lost during the 
Teutoberg massacre in a series of campaigns between 14-16 A.D.  Roman legions again 
confronted Arminius and his allies, Tacitus informs us that the purpose was to avenge the 
Varus defeat, not to expand the Empire, and most modern investigators seem to agree 
with that assessment
.  They were a culture of hunter gatherers with a fierce reputation as 
warriors.      
50
Germanicus has been a man whose reputation has made him more renown then he 
may have actually been.  He was like John F. Kennedy, young, promising and cut down 
in his prime, but whose image is more pronounced than his actual accomplishments.  The 
myth that grew up around Germanicus was based not on what he actually did, but on 
what he might have achieved.  He was much more important to Rome in death than in 
life
.  There was no real chance of conquest anyways, and it must be 
said they went for revenge for the lost legions not for Varus.  Varus would always remain 
a stain on Rome’s military record. 
51
Germanicus was to begin operations in 15 A.D. and had four legions under his 
disposal.  Some 12,000 legionaries made up the four brigades in lower Germany.  
Germanicus also took 13,000 auxiliary infantry and 4,000 cavalry.  One historian said, 
“Germanicus improvised the autumn campaign to restore discipline to his legions in 
lower Germany”.  Yet it did not harm his cause that the tribe he targeted was the Marsi, 
.  Germanicus was a very capable general, but basically he was a more likable 
person than Tiberius.  Later Tiberian tactics enforced by Sejanus destroyed his reputation 
leading Roman historians to glorify Germanicus and blast Tiberius.   
                                               
49 Oldfather and Canter.  (16) 
50 Wells, Peter S.  (204) 
51 Murdoch.  (130) 
one of the conspirators at Teutoberg52.  Germanicus used the navy as well in his plan.  In 
both years Germanicus’ strategy centered on the Ems, on which his land and Naval forces 
converged53
The first task was to refortify Roman positions that had been destroyed by the 
Germanic tribes.  Germanicus rehabilitated a fort that his father had used on Mount 
Taunus to use as his base for the campaign
.  He knew the importance of the waterways as staging areas for advancing 
on Germanic territory.   
54.  Ancient militaries were completely 
dependant on fortifications to supply their army.  In 15 A.D. Germanicus conducts 
operations on the Rhine.  The mission: to secure the territory for Rome and subdue the 
Cherusci and neighboring tribes55
Though with the loss of men Rome could not sustain the number of forts they had 
previously occupied.  Apart from the legionary base at Vindonissa, it is unlikely that a 
substantial military presence was maintained after about 17 A.D.  Such units as were 
retained were probably small and designed to protect strategic positions, e.g. Bregenz and 
Chur
.  The problem of Rome advancing into the Rhine was 
because when Varus was defeated he left the forts open to be destroyed.  The Germans 
would put-up resistance when Rome tried to rebuild them.  Nighttime raids on Roman 
forts hindered progress in the early stages.  
56
                                               
52 Murdoch.  (136) 
.  This is a great example that Rome did not have the power needed to sustain a 
viable network of fortifications before and after Teutoberg, while trying to conquer 
Germany.  If successful in his campaign, Germanicus had a chance to transorm the defeat 
of the hapless Varus into his own personal victory and gain territory that Augustus could 
53 Wells, C.M.  (241) 
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not57
Symbolism was a key to ancient warfare and the bodies of Roman soldiers were 
still at Teutoberg.  Survivors of the disaster at Teutoberg accompanied Germanicus.  
They pointed out stained and scorched altars.  It was here that Germans under Arminius 
had burned the tribunes and first rank centurions alive.  The men reported blow by blow, 
how the three eagles had been captured and pointed out where the officers had been 
killed
.  Rome’s resources were stretched entirely too thin, especially after they lost their 
northern legions. 
58
This action of Germanicus was dangerous and he got a reprimand for it.  The 
Romans did not sanctify death and their presence was dangerous for the men’s morale.  
The remains of the makeshift gibbets from which Roman soldiers had been hanged, the 
pits into which still-living infantry men had been thrown, the skulls nailed to nearby trees 
were not an appropriate sight for legionaries
.  The sight of the dead terrified the Romans, but must have made their blood boil 
with rage at the same time.  Germanicus needed to see the site to believe the carnage.   
59.  Ironically, the slaughter was so one sided 
the Romans could not see German armaments.  To Germanicus and his men the 
battlefield looked like the one-sided slaughter that it had been.  Like the ancient Spartans, 
the Germans came back with their shield or one them, so their fallen had long been 
buried60
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.  It was truly one of the worst sights of slaughter in the history of the Roman 
military.  During excavations in the mid-1990’s archaeologists found collections of bones 
58 Murdoch.  (2) 
59 Murdoch.  (3) 
60 Murdoch.  (3) 
which had been collected and buried in five pits61
Germanic tribes lacked unity, but they had massive amounts people.  Germany 
had as a whole 60 tribes with a maximum 3,000,000 people.  The Rhine, Elbe, Main 
Saale district with 20-23 tribes a maximum of 1,000,000 to 1,150,000 people
.  The massive scale of the pits shows a 
tremendous display of carnage. 
62.  
Manpower was a distinct advantage for the Germanic tribes in the area.  Two other 
advantages the Germans had on their side, one a difficult terrain, the other inadequate 
supplies for a large force of invaders63.  However, when the campaigning began Rome 
still has a superior military force, because they were a trained army.  Their equipment and 
tactics were better then the Germans.  The Romans could select their own time and place 
for an attack, and support a forward thrust in any direction by a powerful flank 
movement64
 Twice Germanicus had led forces away from Germanic tribes trying to ambush 
them.  Then in the spring of the year 15, Germanicus made a sudden raid on the Chatti.  
Having taken the Chatti by surprise, he massacred them, laid the country to waste and 
refused to discuss terms of peace with them
.  The end result was that this time Rome had an opportunity to pick the place 
of the next battle unlike Varus who was completely ambushed.  
65.  His victory against the Chatti was not a 
military victory on the battlefield, but a raid on unsuspecting people.  Meanwhile, with 
the war in progress a triumph was decreed him.  Even before this Tiberius had praised 
Germanicus to the Senate for his success in suppressing the mutiny66
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.  This is just a 
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symbolic gesture by Tiberius, because Germanicus’ handling of the mutiny was actually 
quite poor.  Later the triumph was not given to Germanicus until the year 17.  
Germanicus’ campaign dealt with the pro-Arminian tribe of the Bructeri.  The 
tribal groups involved with the westward movement included the Chatti mentioned 
above, probably the Cherusci, the Bructeri and a number of smaller people67.  The 
Bructeri had helped attack Varus’ legions in the previous war and were known as great 
warriors.  The Bructeri held importance to Tiberius having escaped an attempt on his life 
by a member of the clan.  According to Suetonius, “One of the Bructeri had gotten access 
to him through one of his attendants, but was affected by his nervousness, whereupon a 
confession was forced out of him through torture”68
Germanicus deserves credit for the execution of his plan.  Based in the general 
area of the town of Muster, between the Ems and the Lippe, the tribe was in the 
ascendant at the moment the Romans came
.  It was Germanicus’ plan to draw 
them out into the open, flank them with his cavalry and block off their escape with the 
Roman Navy. 
69.  Arminius was busy chasing Caecina’s 
forces around the Rhine when Germanicus saw his chance to attack.  The attack was a 
complete success.  Germanicus planned his confrontation carefully—it was a combined 
assault of, cavalry, with infantry and the fleet arriving from different directions—and the 
Bructeri were slaughtered.  Best of all, the first of Varus’ three lost eagles were 
recovered: that of Legion XIX70
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.  It was a resounding victory for Germanicus he had 
obliterated a major ally of Arminius and done it with little loss of men. 
68 Suetonius.  (133) 
69 Murdoch.  (139) 
70 Murdoch.  (139) 
The rest of the campaign season had uneventful skirmishes. Caecina had four 
legions with him during the campaign season, but they were meant to re-establish 
positions if something happened to Germanicus.  One day as they marched towards long 
bridges, they realized that Arminius had anticipated their route, and that the surrounding 
hills were covered with Germans71.  The Romans were attacked the entire afternoon 
completely bogged down in the plains.  There was a fear of another Teutoberg, because 
the scenario was nearly the same.  Germans threw down missiles as the Romans tried to 
get away to safety.  According to Tacitus,”the general’s night was disturbed by a sinister 
and alarming dream: for he imagined that he saw Quintilius Varus risen, blood-
bedraggled, from the marsh, and heard him calling”72
The Germans had destroyed the camp when the Romans had left, it was a 
demoralizing sight to the Romans.  When Arminius and his men attacked the camp the 
next day the Romans rallied, the Germans found themselves trapped in the fort.  Attacked 
from the rear the Germans were routed and slaughtered throughout the day, severely 
wounding Arminius’ uncle
.  The Roman soldiers had survived 
to fight again.   
73.  However, troops at Xanten were unaware of the Roman 
victory and began to panic.  As Roman troops began to destroy the bridge across the 
Rhine, Germanicus’ wife Agrippina welcomed them back.  Over the next weeks she 
became known as the lady of the lamp, distributing clothes and medicines to those who 
had lost everything or were wounded74
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.  Her reputation would grow to mythic status in 
later years after tragedy. 
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Romans have seen 15 A.D. as a success, because they re-established their forts, 
won at Muster, and most importantly survived.  However, Arminius picked at them piece 
by piece throughout the year and stopped Germanicus from taking over his tribal army.  
Although Arminius had been thwarted in his end-game, he had both won a great deal of 
Roman booty and inflicted significant losses on them75
The first year of Germanicus’ war Rome had discovered some unfortunate truths 
about their empire.  The major realization was that they were vulnerable and were not as 
strong as they thought they were.  It took Julius Caesar six years to conquer Gaul and 
Vercingetorix nearly beat him.  However, Germanicus had only two campaigns to 
succeed at taking over a territory vastly larger, complex, and harsher then in Gaul.  
Germany was one big forest capable of massive ambushes at any time, Romans like open 
ground where they can maneuver.  Germanicus had to deal with Tiberius, at this time the 
man with the army had power and Tiberius was aware of this.  Germanicus’ continual 
desire to transgress boundaries on the periphery of the Roman world—geographical and 
moral—poses a threat to the stability of Rome
.  He had been beaten, but not 
defeated that year and he had proven that Rome was a military the Germanic tribes could 
face.  Arminius showed that Rome would need a sustainable multi-year campaign of all 
their resources to defeat the Germanic people. 
76
Germanicus was definitely on a tighter leash in the year 16 A.D.  Germanicus 
planned a predominantly marine expedition and much of the spring was spent in rapidly 
.  These factors would come into play 
during the 16 A.D. campaign.  The year would be a turning point in Roman policy for 
decades to come. 
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constructing a fleet that could drop right in the heart of Germany77.  The plan was to use 
the fleet in order to protect forts and bridges from German raids like the one that had 
happened the previous year.  Germany was unique, because it was so dependant on 
waterways to secure a position of attack.  Tacitus suggests that the existing Rhine was 
boosted by a thousand ships of all shapes and sizes: some flat-bottomed assault craft, 
some with decks for artillery, others kitted out to transport horses78
While the Romans had left the previous year, the tribes had destroyed the burial 
with the dead Roman Legionaries.  Arminius had begun preparing for a showdown with 
Germanicus.  Intelligence reports showed that Arminius was mobilized in a forest near 
Germanicus’ forces.  Thus forewarned, the Romans were able to ensure that an attack did 
not take place that night
.  Arminius’ brother 
Flavus had even sided with the Romans and the two shouted at each other from across the 
Rhine.  Germanicus and Arminius knew that this was the year that a decisive battle had to 
take place. 
79.  The key for Rome was to draw out Arminius into an open 
ground attack and ambush his forces.  The imminent battle might afford them the desired 
goal of peace through victory80
Arminius that night had drawn a battle line across the river Wiser, with only 1 
man, Germanicus walked out incognito to discover the attitude of his men.  According to 
Tacitus he was emboldened by what he heard and by a vision of the night, he called his 
.  However, Arminius had been too smart for a foolish 
blunder and with the value of his men it was unlikely he would ever do so.   
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troops together the following morning to encourage them for the conflict81.  It would 
have been a site of immense symbolism, after 7 years there would be a great battle in 
Germany.  In the plain called Idisiaviso or Idistaviso the Romans and the Cherusci met82
The battle was to Germanicus and the Romans liking, though surrounded by trees 
it was an open area.  That it had come to a pitched battle is curious.  What had made 
Arminius so outstanding as a commander so far was his recognition that he could not 
compete with the Romans on a level playing field
.  
It was not the first and it would not be the last time the two sides fought against each 
other. 
83.  It may have been the need by his 
soldiers to take on the Romans, or simply blind overconfidence by the Cheruscan 
General.  The god’s favored the Romans; Germanicus saw eight eagles fly into the 
woods, “Follow the Roman birds, true gods of our legions”, he said84
Germanicus’ strategy used the same basic Roman flanking maneuver he had at 
Muster.  Against their orders, the Cheruscans charged, while Germanicus sent the best of 
his cavalry round to fall on the German flank and rear.  Arminius tried to rally his troops 
and himself led the head-on attack towards the Roman archers
.  Rome unleashed 
hell with a furious rage into the forest, the memory of their lost legions clinging in their 
heads.  The might of the ancient world once more came forth to show the glory of the 
empire. 
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.  It was a gallant effort 
he charged sword drawn into the center lines.  The sight of such an act inspired his men 
to push on, it was an act of pure bravery.  Injured in those first moments, he smeared his 
82 Mierow.  (144) 
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face with his own blood to disguise his face, regained control of his horse and charged off 
to safety86
The battle took around an hour, but the Romans were the superior soldiers that 
day.  Maybe by a miracle Arminius might have been able to salvage the day, but not 
likely.  As it became apparent the Romans had won, and with few casualties (the majority 
were killed in the first German assault), the legionaries routed and slaughtered the 
remaining barbarians during the rest of the day
.  The injury was worse then they originally thought and Arminius was unable 
to continue the fight.  The Romans began to take the field. 
87
The battle was a weird similarity to what had happened at Tuetoberg.  A territorial 
boundary was used to enclose in the Romans, but it in fact enclosed in Arminius’ forces.  
Unlike Varus, this time Germanicus had been smart about tactics on the battlefield.  His 
infantry was split in two: half to charge those in the forest, the other to attack the wall 
behind which the Germans were hiding, while the cavalry was sent to secure the path and 
the swampy plain
.  Ironically, unlike Kalkriese the forest 
hindered and hurt the Germans here.  The forest pinned them in and the Romans were 
able to surround them from escape.   
88.  It was a day that saved the spirit of the Roman people; they knew 
they were still the dominant military force in the world.  They completely annihilated the 
Germanic army on there ground and had taken the day.  It was here that Tiberius was 
honored by old customs as Imperator by his victorious troops89
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.  Arminius and the 
Germanic tribes moved inward to avoid another slaughter. 
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The Romans did fight little skirmishes along outposts and Germanicus signed a 
non-aggression pact with a tribe.  Once again Tiberius feared that Germanicus would get 
too powerful and become a rival to his reign.  The year’s campaigning ended in a high 
note.  After a tip-off from the Marsi tribe, a commando raid managed to recover the 
second of Varus’ eagles90
The ships would be sent back to Rome along with other soldiers.  Although the 
Battle of Idistaviso had been a resounding success for the Romans, upon their return to 
winter quarters they encounter a violent storm
.  The year had been a success, but Rome again slinked away 
without gaining any massive territory.  Even with a massive victory Rome had no power 
in dominating the Germanic tribes.  Again showing that Rome was not capable of taking 
the Germanic territory whether Germanicus stayed or not.  The troops going back would 
go by boat and receive worse fortunes. 
91.  The storm was massive enough to be 
remembered by Roman historians.  Some ships were sunk, others scattered and some 
were blown so far off course they ended up as far away as Britain.  Germanicus’ fleet 
stumbled into port, some ships towing others, clothing used for sails, those that could 
make it often only had a few rowers92.  After the year of campaigning, the victory, the joy 
of getting the eagle back, Germanicus’ army gets beaten by the sea.  Shipwrecked 
survivors told stories of returning from beyond the world, and saw unknown birds and 
sea monsters half-man, half-beast93
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.  There were claims that Germanicus was so 
distraught by the loss of his men at sea that he contemplated suicide.  However there is 
little likelihood this is factually true. 
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Germanicus received a grand triumph upon his return to Rome for a great victory, 
the year before his lieutenants ended up getting the triumph.  Now, in May of the year 17, 
Germanicus celebrated his triumph and was viewed in person by the populace of Rome in 
a chariot that bore his five children94
Germanicus had pleaded for one last campaign knowing the reaction and 
statement it made to Tiberius, but he would never have gotten the chance.  Erich 
Koestermann believes that the campaigns of 15-16 A.D. were a complete waste of money 
and resources: the emperor should have either had the courage to finish the war or should 
have never started it
.  The spectacle was grand with Caligula at his side 
the adopted mascot of his troops and later the worst emperor in Roman history.  The two 
symbolize what could have been and will be.  The loss of idealism and the grandeur of 
Rome are symbolic in Germanicus and the lost legions of Augustus.   
95
Germanicus became too powerful for his own good, the other major point of 
Rome’s lack of expansionism is the power of the emperor.  Territory could no longer be 
taken without explicit permission of one man.  Good men under bad emperors know how 
to walk the tight rope between defiance and servitude, between observing political 
decorum and maintaining self-respect
.  It is difficult not to agree with this point, Rome should have 
known they did not have the capability of conquering the Germanic people, even before 
Varus.  They had been stretched thin on the Rhine for years before they lost their legions.  
Varus is just an easy target for ancient Roman historians to lay blame on. 
96
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.  Germanicus has been glorified, but he was a 
pain in Tiberius side and had ambitions of his own.  The time of Caesar and Pompeii 
taking armies off and doing what they want to for self-gain was over.  Germanicus had 
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become a threat so expansion was taken away from him.  In view of his battles with Piso, 
Germanicus readily believed Piso had poisoned him, curse tablets with Germanicus’ 
name were found under the house97
Augustus’ hope for German conquest turned out to be just a dream, because he  
reached too greedily and appointed the wrong man to achieve his goal.  He got a foothold 
in the territory and established bases.  However, his German campaigns will always be 
measured by his lost legions.  Rome had tried foolishly to take on Marobodous at the end 
of the first century B.C., following-up with a disastrous loss of three legions at 
Teutoberg, and finally a fairly successful but vane campaigns by Germanicus.  They all 
proved that Rome was not strong enough to take on the Germanic tribes.  Tacitus 
believed that Germanicus’ campaign was an attempt to obliterate Varus’ memory, but 
that the memory of what the soldiers beheld at Teutoberg was beyond obliteration
.  He died on October 10, 19 A.D., people later 
believed Tiberius had a hand in it.  Arminius would join him that year after being killed 
by people in his own faction. 
98
  
.  
Rome was different after Teutoberg, the lessons learned there and by Germanicus were 
hard ones for the Romans to swallow.  Rome had forggoten to manage their expansion 
with realism and the Rhine would prove the boundary of the Roman Empire for centuries.                         
       
  
         
 
                                               
97 Mierow.  (148) 
98 Woodman.  (126) 
Works Cited 
 
Benario, Herbert W.  “Roman Germany, Three Sites”.  The Classical Journal Vol. 51 No. 
 7, April 1956.  (317-21) 
 
Cassius Dio.  The Roman History: The Reign of Augustus.  London: Penguin Classic  
 Books, 1987. 
 
Dornberg, John.  “Battle of the Teutoberg Forest: A Strip of Land in Western Germany 
 Yields Evidence of a Massacre That Changed the Course of Ancient History”   
Archaeology 45.5.  1992. pg. 26-32. 
 
Lissner, Ivar.  The Caesars: Might and Madness.  New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1958. 
 
Mierow, Charles Christopher.  “Germanicus Caesar Imperator”  The Classical Journal,  
 Vol. 39 No. 3,  December 1943.  (137-155) 
 
Murdoch, Adrian.  Rome’s Greatest Defeat: Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest.  Stroud,  
 England: Sutton Publishing, 2006. 
 
Oldfather, William Abbott.  The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of  
 Augustus.  Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1915. 
 
Pagan, Victoria E.  “Beyond Teutoburg: Transgression and Transformation in Tacitus  
 Annales 1.61-62”.  Classical Philology Vol. 94 No. 3, July 1999.  (302-320) 
 
Suetonius.  The Twelve Caesars.  London: Penguin Classic Books, 1957. 
 
Tacitus.  The Annals of Imperial Rome.  London: Penguin Classic Books, 1956. 
 
Tacitus.  The Histories.  London: Penguin Classic Books, 1964. 
 
Todd, Malcolm.  The Northern Barbarians: 100 B.C.-A.D. 300.  London: Hutchinson & 
 Company, 1975. 
 
Todd, Malcolm.  “Rome and the Germans: The Frontier and Beyond”  Britannia, Vol. 23. 
 The Promotion of Roman Studies, 1992.  pg. 325-330 
 
Wells, Peter S.  The Barbarians Speak: How the Conquered Peoples Shaped Roman  
 Europe.  Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
 
Wells, Peter S.  The Battle That Stopped Rome: Emperor Augustus, Arminius, and the  
 Slaughter of the Legions in the Teutoberg Forest.  New York: WW Norton & Co.  
 2003. 
 
Wells, Colon Michael.  The German Policy of Augustus: An Examination of the 
 Archaeological Evidence.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972. 
 
Woodman, A.J.  Tactitus Reviewed.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
